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Brian Tennyson and Roger Sarty 
During the summer of 1918. when German submarines thrust into North American 
coastal waters, Sydney. Nova Scotia suddenly 
became a major naval base and Canada's 
foremost convoy assembly harbour.1 Nearly a 
hundred of the Royal Canadian Navy's coastal 
patrol vessels came to the Cape Breton port, with 
at least 1,500 crewmen and shore personnel,2 
but this was not enough. Britain was unable to 
help. Therefore the United States Navy pitched 
in for what was the first instance of joint 
operations by the armed forces of the two North 
American nations. Some 350 American sailors 
came to establish base facilities and operate 
patrol vessels and aircraft assigned to Sydney. 
Thousands more passed through on ships 
assembling for convoy. J u s t as the naval 
authorities at Sydney had to cope with rapidly 
changing and increasing operational demands, 
so too the citizens had to deal with a veritable 
naval invasion of their town. 
Sydney, for most of the First World War, was 
a small outstation of Halifax. That began to 
change in 1917 when the success of German 
submarine attacks on merchant shipping in the 
eastern Atlantic forced the British Admiralty to 
sail cargo vessels from North America in 
defended convoys. Britain depended upon this 
North American trade for fully 50 per cent of its 
imports . Sydney, with its large harbour, 
abundant coal supplies, and strategic location 
on both the St. Lawrence route and the Great 
Circle route to Europe, became the assembly 
port for slow-speed shipping from Canadian and 
US ports. As many as 50 to 60 vessels appeared 
for each convoy, which sailed at eight-day 
intervals.3 
In 1917 the danger of submarine attack 
remained in the eastern Atlantic but that changed 
in 1918. During the winter the British Admiralty 
warned that new types of large, long-range 
submarines would almost certainly begin to 
strike in Canadian and US waters beginning in 
the coming spring. The Admiralty, however, had 
to renege on its long-standing promise to send 
destroyers, the best type of anti-submarine and 
convoy escort ship, to help deal with the threat. 
Small coastal patrol craft were being built in 
Canada for the Royal Navy, and the British 
arranged to turn 66 of these over to the Canadian 
service. The better of these craft were 30 steel 
trawlers of about 350 tons displacement that 
carried a light gun and a few depth charges, and 
could make a best speed of 10 knots. They were, 
in other words, scarcely a third of the size of a 
destroyer with considerably less than half the 
speed and a tiny fraction of the armament. The 
36 wooden drifters were smaller still, and had a 
speed of no more t h a n 9 knots in ideal 
condi t ions . Moreover, Canada , having 
concentrated on raising land forces for the 
Western Front and cur ta i led i ts naval 
development to about two dozen converted 
civilian steamers on British advice, would at this 
late stage in the war be very hard-pressed to find 
qualified seamen for the 66 craft.4 
Not surprisingly, Vice-Admiral William 
Lowther Grant, the British Commander-in-Chief, 
North America and West Indies and the senior 
officer responsible for the convoy system in the 
western Atlantic, was worried. With no help 
forthcoming from Britain, Grant looked south 
to the newest member of the Allied coalition. He 
set up a meeting in Washington between senior 
Canadian and US Navy officers on 20 April to 
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see what could be done. The Americans offered 
six submarine chasers, 110-foot long wooden 
craft that were somewhat better armed than most 
of the Canadian vessels, with a much better 
speed of 16 knots. They also promised to send 
naval air patrol units to Halifax and Sydney, but 
this more ambitious scheme would take some 
time to arrange.5 The US Navy s u b m a r i n e 
chasers arrived at Halifax on 16 May 1918. 
Feeble as these craft were compared to 
destroyers, they were the most capable warships 
available and immediately took up the task of 
long-range convoy escort. There was much of this 
work to do in Halifax in the spring of 1918. 
During the winter freeze-up of the St. Lawrence, 
the slow convoys, designated "HS," moved from 
Sydney to Halifax. The latter port was also the 
year-round assembly point for smaller "HC" 
convoys of more valuable "medium speed" ships, 
including troop t ransports . The American 
chasers were organized into two divisions of 
three vessels each, one being responsible for the 
slow convoy, and the other for the medium speed 
convoy. The chasers stayed with the convoys for 
the first twenty-four hours of passage, a distance 
of 150 to 200 miles. Submarines could most 
readily lie in wait and make contact with convoys 
in this critical coastal waters zone, where the 
ships were most vulnerable as they slowly picked 
up speed and manoeuvred into cruising 
formation. The slower Canadian patrol vessels 
kept a watch at the harbour mouth before and 
during the departure of the merchantmen, and 
then did their best to keep up a screen around 
them for a few hours as they picked up speed.6 
Meanwhile, during the spring of 1918 work 
was urgently underway at Sydney to prepare for 
the vastly increased operations planned for the 
summer. Buildings were rented or constructed 
on the waterfront to serve as workshops, 
storehouses and barracks. The first patrol 
vessels arrived as soon as they were able to push 
their way through the ice in late May, and 
increasing numbers came in the following six 
weeks. Two-thirds of the new trawlers and 
drifters were assigned to Sydney, together with 
the bulk of the most capable armed yachts and 
civilian steamers that had carried out coastal 
patrols since earlier in the war. Among the latter 
were the fisheries patrol vessel Canada, the 
customs vessel Margaret, the post office steamer 
Lady Evelyn, the former American seagoing 
yachts Stadacona and Hochelaga, and the 
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hydrographie survey ships Acadia and Cartier. 
None of these "auxiliary patrol ships" was as fast 
as the US chasers, but they were bigger and more 
seaworthy. They were therefore assigned, 
together with some of the new trawlers, to a 
"Mobile Patrol Flotilla," which had the job of 
filling in for destroyers in the offensive hunting 
role. The Patrol flotilla was organized into 
divisions that each included one or two of the 
larger ships and a pair of trawlers. The task of 
these divisions was to roam the Gulf of St. 
Lawrence and waters south of Newfoundland 
ready to respond to any reports of submarines, 
or to assist the convoys funnelling out of Halifax 
and Sydney. The rest of the trawlers and drifters 
at Sydney were assigned to a "Forming Up Escort 
and Outer Patrol Flotilla" to screen the HS 
convoys as they emerged from port and formed 
up in the Cabot Strait.7 
The Patrol and Forming Up flotillas began to 
function in early July, when HS 47, the first 
convoy of the 1918 season to assemble at Sydney, 
departed. One division of American submarine 
chasers, SC 51, SC 183 and SC 241, moved for 
the season from Halifax to Sydney just in time 
to provide the long-range escort for this convoy.8 
In theory this all seemed efficient. The reality 
was otherwise. One bright spot was the 
dependability of the US chasers, which were 
almost unfailingly ready for service and on 
station when and where they were required. This 
said a great deal about the ability of the US Navy 
to produce ships and trained personnel in a 
hurry. Canada, by contrast, had barely a shadow 
organization.9 Many of the new craft, which 
formed the bulk of the Sydney fleet, were only 
completed in the preceding winter and spring, 
by builders with limited experience, in the midst 
of the extreme chills and sudden thaws of the 
St. Lawrence River region that caused hull 
structures to shrink and expand, opening many 
leaks. Armament was slow to arrive from Britain, 
and was still being fitted in many of the vessels 
as late as August. The only two marine 
engineering firms of any size, Sydney Foundry 
and North Sydney Marine Railway, were unequal 
to the heavy demands thrust upon them, so 
Sydney-based ships disappeared for days or 
weeks to yards around the Maritimes or, quite 
often, struggled out to sea without essential work 
having been done.10 The crews were a mixture 
of older civilian seamen, with little or no naval 
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HMCS Lansdowne, the name given to the rented waterfront facilities that served as the RCN patrol base at 
Sydney, NS in the 1918 season. Among the vessels at the wharf are the drifter CD 73, one of the New 
England trawler-minesweepers (called 'PVs in RCN service), and the Admiralty trawler TR 33 . 
(Maritime Command Museum) 
experience, and teenagers with even less. 
Qualified personnel were so thinly spread that 
they not infrequently jumped from one vessel as 
it came into port onto another about to sail. 
In early August this shaky organization came 
under extreme pressure. No one expected early 
trouble. British naval intelligence, which had 
broken German naval radio codes, knew that 
the submarine U-156, which had arrived in US 
waters in mid-July, had orders to remain mere.11 
What such excellent intelligence could not foresee 
was an aggressive commander going beyond his 
orders. That is what happened at the beginning 
of August. After causing a furore with attacks on 
shipping in the Gulf of Maine, U 156 easily 
eluded the US Navy hunting group that was in 
pursuit, and suddenly appeared off Halifax on 
the morning of 5 August, sinking a tanker within 
30 miles of the harbour mouth. The Halifax 
flotilla, which was further out to sea protecting 
an HC convoy of troopships, could not reach the 
scene in time. Although everyone breathed a sigh 
of relief that the transports, carrying 12,000 
Canadian and American soldiers, had escaped 
attack, it was clear that the anti-submarine 
warships available could not secure the Halifax 
approaches.12 
Within hours of the attack on the tanker, 
Admiral Grant ordered all merchant shipping 
bound for Halifax to make for Sydney, clear of 
U-l56's hunting area. Prior to the appearance 
of the submarine, medium speed vessels 
allocated to carry American troops and supplies 
had loaded at New York, and then gone to Halifax 
to join up into HC convoys with vessels carrying 
Canadian troops and cargoes that had loaded at 
Montreal and Halifax. Henceforth, the Montreal 
and Halifax ships were to assemble at Sydney 
and sail so as to rendezvous with the New York 
ships on the Grand Banks east of Newfoundland, 
clear of the coastal danger area. This was an 
operation that required precision and intimate 
cooperation between shipping and convoy 
authorities in Ottawa, Montreal, Halifax, New 
York, Washington, and, of course, Sydney, which 
bore the ultimate responsibility for getting the 
Montreal and Halifax ships to sea in good time 
while also maintaining the large HS convoy 
series.13 
Captain Walter Hose, an experienced British 
naval officer who had transferred to the Canadian 
service and commanded all the flotillas based at 
Sydney, now had to rejig the organization he was 
still laboriously putting into place. He reassigned 
31 
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the American submarine chaser division, his 
fastest group, to the long-range escort of the HC 
convoys and gave responsibility for the HS series 
to the auxiliary patrol ships and trawlers of the 
Mobile Patrol Flotilla.14 
The Sydney section of HC 13 — four 
merchant vessels and the British armed 
merchant cruiser HMS Victorian — sailed on 14 
August, only two days later than the usual eight-
day cycle, and duly met the New York group on 
the Grand Banks on the 16th.15 The whole 
performance was an impressive demonstration 
of the efficiency of the shipping control 
organization after a year's experience with 
convoy. 
The sailing of two ocean convoys every eight 
days was only par t of the increased and 
unexpected commitments for Sydney in the 
summer of 1918. Most important among the 
other new tasks was the escort of groups of high-
value merchant ships between Halifax and 
Sydney, Sydney into the Gulf of St. Lawrence, 
and between Sydney and Newfoundland ports. 
The system was not formally organized as it 
would be in the Second World War, but it was 
comprehensive and, as in the later war, Sydney 
served as the central hub. Oddly, there is virtually 
no mention of the coastal convoy system in the 
policy and operations files but the surviving 
sh ips ' logs and repor t s of proceedings , 
fragmentary as they are, leave no doubt that local 
escort was a major commitment. The available, 
sketchy information shows that 13 trawlers and 
auxiliary patrol vessels carried out 15 local 
escort missions during the last three weeks of 
August alone. There is some evidence that the 
ferry that ran between North Sydney and Port-
aux-Basques, Newfoundland, was regularly 
escorted and conclusive evidence that the St. 
John's run had a top priority equal to that from 
Halifax, with groups of two and three escorts 
being assembled for each voyage. Among the 
ships shepherded from Sydney to St. John's and 
back were the vessels that supplied the Sydney 
and Sydney Mines steel mills with ore from the 
mines at Wabana in Conception Bay, near St. 
John's.16 
U-l56 had gone back to US waters after the 
attack off Halifax on 5 August, but then returned 
to Nova Scotia waters and announced the fact 
with panache. On 21 August the crew of the 
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fishing trawler Triumph came ashore in boats 
at Canso, Nova Scotia, with an amazing story. 
The day before, some 60 miles offshore, the 
Germans had seized the trawler, run up their 
ensign, and used the Canadian vessel to attack 
other fishing craft. Soon scores of fishermen were 
streaming ashore. This apparently bold action 
was in fact a desperate one. The tiny fishing 
vessels were barely worth the time and effort 
required to sink them, but U-l56 could not pick 
up any trace of the big ships that were its priority 
target; all of these had been grouped into the 
new coastal convoy system and the main 
transoceanic convoys. On 20 August the 43 
merchantmen of HS 52 had sailed from Sydney 
under the long-range escort of Canadian navy 
trawlers, and the next day the Canadian section 
of HC 14 had put out from Sydney under the 
protection of the US submarine chasers.17 Thus 
there was no regular traffic of unprotected major 
steamers that the submarine had banked on 
finding, just empty seas. 
The allied navies had long anticipated raids 
on the fishing fleets, but concluded that little 
could be done. Hundreds of vessels fished in a 
thousand mile arc from the Gulf of Maine to the 
Great Bank east of Newfoundland, all following 
their noses to the best catch. Almost none of the 
fishing craft carried radios, meaning word of 
attacks, as in the case of those off Canso and 
eastern Cape Breton, did not get out until the 
fishermen had rowed ashore long after the 
event.18 
Nevertheless, when word reached Sydney on 
21 August of the attacks off Canso, wide ranging 
patrols of the fishing banks immediately became 
a major new commitment. As the US chasers 
and Canadian ships returned from escort duty 
they hurriedly put to sea again.19 One of these 
missions, by a division of the Mobile Patrol 
Flotilla, caught sight of U-l56 in the vicinity of 
the i s land of St. Pierre on 25 August . 
Unfortunately, the lead vessel, HMCS Hochelaga, 
turned away to get support from the other vessels 
of the division some miles away; by the time the 
warships returned the U-boat was long gone. 
Hose was aghast at this evidence of poor training 
and spirit; Hochelaga's commanding officer was 
court-martialled and dismissed from the service. 
Privately, senior officers admitted that the tiny 
patrol vessels would have little chance if one of 
the big submarines fought back, but that was 
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no excuse for Hochelaga, which could have 
shaken the morale of the U-boat's crew and 
possibly even inflicted some damage.20 
More importantly, two ocean convoys, HS 53 
and HC 15, got safely away from Sydney on 28-
29 August. Evidence now available shows that 
Scotia" to show no lights after dark. In fact, 
according to Captain Frederick Pasco, the retired 
Royal Navy officer who had come out for service 
in Canada to command the shore establishments 
and convoy staff at Sydney, these regulations had 
been in effect for two years but had not been 
enforced in Sydney because "they would be 
SC 242 - One of the six 110-foot wooden American submarine chasers that operated under RCN control in 
May-November 1918. SC 242 was part of the division that ran fast escort missions from Sydney. In addition 
to a stern depth charge chute, she carried a "Y" gun, which can be clearly seen on the quarter deck, to fire 
charges off both beams. Forward is a 6-pounder quick-firing gun. 
(Directorate of History and Heritage, Department of National Defence Negative CN 3280) 
their tracks passed within about 100 miles of 
the routes U-156 and a second submarine U-
117 (which kept well out to sea) . Had the 26 
ships in the two convoys sailed independently 
on varying courses at intervals as each became 
ready for sea, the two submarines would have 
had a good chance of locating and sinking several 
of them.21 
With the naval war being fought so close to 
Sydney, it is not surprising that steps were taken 
to tighten up security in the coastal communities. 
Blackout regu la t ions were imposed in 
September, requiring "all seaport towns in Nova 
obviously ineffective here because of the Steel 
Company whose lights are blazing all the night 
and as they could not be extinguished it would 
serve no good purpose to darken the city."22 As 
one sea captain asked, "what would be the use 
of darkened lights in houses and on automobiles 
in this city when the glare from the steel plant, 
when slag is being poured, can be observed up 
to thirty five miles at sea?"23 At the same time, 
the detailed published reports on the U-boats' 
activities gathered by newspapermen who 
swarmed around seamen from the sunken ships 
caused mounting concern in naval circles. 
Accordingly, on 3 September the chief press 
33 
5
Tennyson and Sarty: Sydney and the U-Boat War
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1998
censor at Ottawa notified the telephone 
companies that "the transmission of information 
by telephone regarding the movements of 
submarines off the coast, or efforts taken by the 
authori t ies to restrict these activities, is 
forbidden."24 
The arrival of the naval war on Cape Breton's 
doorstep had its greatest impact on life in Sydney 
with the influx into town of hundreds of seamen 
on leave. Many of Sydney's citizens joined in 
under tak ings by local service clubs and 
benevolent organizations to provide badly 
needed social services to the servicemen and 
m e r c h a n t sa i lors pa s s ing t h rough the 
community. The Navy League, for example, 
opened tea rooms in the old St. George's rectory 
on the Esplanade, in July 1918. There the 
members of the Louisbourg and Yendys chapters 
of the Imperial Order of the Daughters of the 
Empire (IODE), assisted by large numbers of 
volunteers from the city, catered to anyone who 
needed a hot meal and comfortable 
surroundings.25 The doors of the tea rooms were 
always open and, in addition to a dining area, 
there were three rooms with newspapers, writing 
tables and a piano. On cool days fires burned in 
the grates. "These fires are very cheery and 
comforting and at times convenient for other 
purposes than keeping people warm (for instance 
when electric toasters go awry in the regions of 
the kitchen and six people are waiting for toast 
and tea and seven more for poached eggs on 
toast.)"26 
Many servicemen and merchant sailors spent 
their time at Sydney not on leave but in the local 
civilian and special military hospitals recovering 
from wounds or illness. Moxham's castle — a 
somewhat grandiose romantic mansion built by 
a former general manager of the Sydney steel 
plant — had been converted into a temporary 
war hospital, as had the less dramatic but 
substantial Ross mansion. Because the Moxham 
hospital was some distance outside the city, the 
local authorities organized a regular bus service 
so that staff and convalescing patients could 
come into town for business or entertainment. 
Mary Isobel MacNeil, who worked at the Moxham 
hospital towards the end of the war, recalled that 
the men nevertheless "always managed to be 
home for meals prepared for them by a good 
cook." She referred particularly to a Mrs. 
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Lindsay, for whom the soldiers composed a song 
entitled "Don't bite the hand that feeds you."27 
On 11 September "that busy organization." 
the Bus iness Girls ' Club, organized an 
entertainment "for all the soldier and sailor 
patients of the Ross and Moxham hospitals." 
Enlisting the help of "nearly every automobile 
owner in the city," the women took the staff and 
patients for a drive "through the scenic sections 
of the district." There were 18 cars in all and 
the tour lasted an hour and a half. When they 
arrived back at the Moxham hospital, a special 
dinner had been prepared, followed by dancing, 
pool and billiards. "From the third floor, where 
the "mumps" moaned at his captivity, to the lower 
floor where the "wall-flower" mentally wailed his 
incapacity, interest was taken in the merry 
waltzing and soft syncopating." The dancing 
began with a set of lancers and "Piper Norman 
Ross was the man of the hour with his pipes 
and Sergt-Major ER Grant with his calling."28 The 
success of this event encouraged more of the 
same.29 Here probably lies the origins of the 
much more ambitious programme by service 
clubs in Sydney during the Second World War to 
provide highly popular excursions in the most 
beautiful and restful parts of the countryside for 
visiting seamen. 
It may be a tribute to the generally welcoming 
spirit of the citizens that there was only one 
major disturbance in which servicemen were the 
main instigators, and this was pretty clearly the 
result of high-handedness on the part of a couple 
of policemen. On the evening of Friday, 30 
August, a police officer attempted to quiet down 
some rowdy sailors. One witness reported that 
"the officer knocked [a] sailor down preparatory 
to putting the cuffs on him and then the trouble 
started." Additional policemen arrived and 
dispersed the seamen. No arrests were made but, 
according to the press, "some of the sailors were 
reported to have said that they intend[ed] 
"cleaning up"" the following night.30 Saturday 
evening, a crowd of Canadian and American 
sailors did indeed gather downtown. Some 
carr ied "improvised c lubs and other 
weapons...concealed in their clothes." When the 
police were unable to disperse the crowd, they 
arrested an American sailor and took him off to 
the jail. The crowd followed and the police felt 
compelled to draw their guns to keep it at bay. 
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U-156, the most aggressive of the German submarines to operate on the coast of Canada and the United 
States in the summer of 1918. During its seven-week mission in the Western Atlantic, U-156 laid mines 
that sank the cruiser USS San Diego, destroyed a tanker with torpedoes and gunfire close off Halifax, and 
captured the Canadian trawler Tr iumph which, with a crew from the submarine, destroyed several schooners 
off Canso and Cape Breton. U-156 itself was destroyed on its return voyage, probably in a minefield in the 
North Sea. (Horst Bredow U-Boot-Rchiv, Sylt, 69-44) 
Sticks, bottles and stones flew in all directions 
and a billiard ball thrown from the window of 
the YMCA went through CP Moore's shop window 
on the opposite side of the street. Women, 
children and civilians followed every move of the 
crowd and commented, some more emphatically 
than elegantly, on the different turns of the affair. 
A few arrests were made and leave for all 
American, British and Canadian sailors was 
cancelled on Sunday. The police chief, JB 
McCormack, after meeting with naval officers, 
gave assurances that "there will be little if any 
trouble of this kind [again]."31 
Captain Pasco, the commander of the port, 
set up a committee that included representatives 
of the naval ships in port to investigate the 
incident. According to Ensign L.B. Sands, the 
US Convoy Officer at Sydney, the American 
sailors "strongly claimed ...that the arrests were 
largely unjustified," and he accused the Sydney 
police of "extreme violence...in dealing with our 
men. All US men who have been arrested are 
variously bruised and cut, and all claim that this 
was done at the hands of the police either before 
actual arrest or during the process of the same." 
He further reported that several American 
officers, including Lieutenant Commander Walter 
May, the commanding officer of the USS Lake 
Eckhart, one of the US Navy vessels in port, 
spoke to McCormack "but were unable to get 
much satisfaction as to the reason for the start 
of the trouble or the manner in which the men 
were treated after arrest."32 
Naval authorities were anxious that the clash 
in the streets should not damage relations either 
among the services or between the services and 
the community. When the case went to court a 
few days later, it was agreed that the payment of 
damages resulting from the riot and an apology 
by the American sailors who had caused it would 
officially end the affair. "War conditions are given 
as the cause of the decision." Of the Canadian 
sailors charged, one was fined $5.75 for his part 
in the trouble, "having cleared himself of the most 
serious charges." Two others were charged with 
breaking and entering Travis' music store. "They 
are alleged to have broken the window of the 
store and to have stolen a mandolin. The musical 
instrument was in the hands of one of the men 
when arrested." Other Canadian sailors faced 
several charges, including participating in a riot 
and carrying concealed weapons.33 The crews of 
the two American warships, Lake Eckhart and 
Lake Benbow, were assessed $280 for property 
damage, which consisted largely of broken plate 
glass windows. 
As the four men arrested and held in detention 
by the police were also under various charges in 
addition to the rioting, such as carrying concealed 
weapons, burglary, and assault upon an officer, 
35 
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it was decided that this was the best settlement 
possible, in that should the men have been 
further tried and found guilty, outside the 
damage, heavy fines would have been imposed, 
and perhaps a jail sentence in addition, to say 
nothing of their absences from their ships, which 
are already undermanned.34 
The American naval officers were so outraged 
at the behaviour of the police, however, that they 
continued to urge an investigation of the force. 
Sands, recognizing that "sentiment is more or 
less against the Navy," advised against it, an 
opinion that Pasco shared. McCormack gave 
assurances that the two police officers about 
whom the Americans were complaining would 
be disciplined "and that all of his men will be 
specially ordered to use no harsh or unnecessary 
m e a s u r e s on any of our men who may 
subsequently be taken under arrest. He is ready 
to personally guarantee this and be responsible 
for the treatment our men receive from now on."35 
The US Navy subsequently restricted shore 
leaves in Sydney "to only a limited number of 
men at a time, and no liberty [was] to extend 
beyond twelve o'clock, and patrols must be sent 
ashore to assist in handling our men." This 
applied to the crews of the submarine chasers 
as well as to the warships and naval transports 
putting into port for convoy.36 
If the violence in the streets damaged 
relations between the town and the armed forces, 
the effects were soon mended under sad 
circumstances in which the citizens rendered 
generous service. The Spanish influenza 
epidemic which swept the western world, killing 
an estimated twenty million people, arrived in 
Sydney. On 22 September 500 infected American 
sailors were brought ashore and, with the 
hospitals overflowing, the Sydney Curling Club's 
rink on George Street and five church halls were 
put to use as temporary wards to accommodate 
them.37 By the 30th the hockey arena was being 
cleaned and fitted up as well.38 On 4 October the 
Post reported that there had been four fatalities 
among the sailors but "these were men who were 
practically beyond hope when they landed from 
the ship." A United States Army medical officer 
who came to help organize the effort39 spoke "in 
the highest terms" of the treatment which the 
American sailors received at Sydney "and of the 
consideration shown by the regular staff of 
doctors and nurses' at the Moxham hospital. 
36 
"Everything was done," he said, "that could 
possibly have been done for their comfort and 
convenience." Indeed, he thought it "a big thing 
that we should have allowed these sick men to 
land in Sydney and be cared for in the hospitals 
at much inconvenience and some danger to the 
people." 
He mentioned very particularly the kindness 
received from the ladles of the town, the gracious 
sympathy shown by the President of the Red 
Cross Society and the practical help given 
through the members, as well as from private 
sources. Soup, custards, ice-cream and other 
delicacies have been sent to the sick men In 
abundance. They are without a grievance and all 
unite in their praise of Sydney hospitality.40 
The influenza epidemic spread to the general 
population, though whether it had come from 
the sailors or arrived by other means is unclear. 
Within two weeks the schools, theatres and 
churches in Sydney were closed.41 Only at the 
end of October did the number of new cases fall 
off.42 
Pervasive as the epidemic was at Sydney, it 
did not hit any of the naval establishments and 
warship divisions severely enough to interfere 
with operations. These continued at full intensity. 
The knowledge from radio intercepts that 
another submarine, U-155, would be arriving 
about mid-September with orders to operate 
against the Halifax and St. John's traffic, and 
that two additional submarines had been 
assigned to North American waters allowed no 
respite. Convoy escort duties, moreover, became 
increasingly challenging. 
The difficult high seas junction of separate 
Sydney and New York sections of the HC convoys 
had only been an interim measure. Intelligence 
indications were that the U-boats would continue 
to focus on the Halifax area, and moreover would 
plant mines, a form of attack to which the port 
was particularly vulnerable. The width of the 
continental shelf off central Nova Scotia made 
mining of the shipping routes possible 100 miles 
and further out to sea. At Sydney, by contrast, 
where the shelf falls quickly away into the deep 
Cabot Strait trench, mining was not nearly so 
grave a threat. The Admiralty had therefore 
ordered medium-speed transports that had 
previously loaded at Halifax and New York to go 
to Montreal. They would then assemble for 
convoy at Quebec City, and could sail north 
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through the Strait of Belle Isle, completely clear 
of the danger area off Nova Scotia and southern 
Newfoundland. The Canadian navy protested 
vehemently, knowing that the Gulf of St. 
Lawrence, with its constricted routes, was one 
area where convoy might not help ships evade 
submarines, but rather lead them into traps at 
the many choke points. What if another U-boat 
commander, like that of U-156, disregarded his 
orders and pushed into the gulf? The British 
insisted, but released to the Canadian service 
some additional drifters and trawlers building 
for the Royal Navy in Canada so that permanent 
patrols could be organized at the choke points 
off Gaspe and in the Strait of Belle Isle. This 
was yet another task that had to be organized 
by Captain Hose's Sydney command.43 
Arrangements for HC 16, the first convoy to 
assemble at Quebec, were a compromise. In 
deference to the Americans, and for the last time, 
a separate section sailed from New York. The 
Admiralty had intended that the Quebec section 
should nevertheless sail north of Newfoundland, 
but agreed to the southern route through the 
Cabot Strait because the new Strait of Belle Isle 
patrol was not yet in place.44 The nine transports 
and British cruiser HMS Cumberland of the 
Quebec group of HC 16 sailed on 4 September. 
Scrambling with only last minute notice because 
of the many changes in plan, Hose managed to 
have three of his auxiliary patrol ships meet the 
convoy nor th of the Magdalenes on 6 
September.45 Meanwhile, the US submarine 
chasers from Sydney waited at the western 
entrance of the Cabot Strait to lend further 
support, but never made contact; a building gale 
severely battered the light wooden vessels and 
they spent a harrowing night taking heavy seas 
aboard, not daring to attempt to approach the 
coast until the wild conditions subsided the next 
day.4 The New York and Quebec sections 
successfully rendezvoused east of Newfoundland 
on the 9th, but 32 hours late because of the 
weather and the appearance of icebergs.47 
Arrangements — and the weather — were 
more settled for HC 17. This was the first convoy, 
which included 15 merchant vessels and the 
armed liner HMS Orvieto, entirely to assemble 
at Quebec. It departed on 13 September and, 
having had proper notice this time, Hose sent 
his fastest auxiliary patrol ships, Lady Evelyn, 
Margaret and Stadacona, in time to meet it on 
the 14th off Gaspé. They carried on with the 
convoy up through the Strait of Belle Isle, a 
journey of nearly 400 miles, before turning back 
for Sydney on the 16th.48 
The smoothness with which this and the 
following medium-speed convoys made the 
challenging northern passage reflected well on 
the crews of the merchant ships and their 
Canadian escorts, but also the Canadian staffs 
at Sydney, Halifax, Montreal and Quebec City 
that had executed the direction of the senior 
British command.49 The difficulty of the northern 
passage may explain why, despite initial British 
hopes the HS series would enter the gulf from 
Sydney and also proceed out the Strait of Belle 
Isle, these slow convoys continued to sail directly 
out into the Atlantic south of Newfoundland. 
These convoys were two to four times larger than 
the HC series, and their creeping 7-knot speed 
made the vessels less manoeuvrable than the 11 
to 12 knot t ransports , a potentially fatal 
disadvantage on the tricky northern route.50 To 
compensate for the danger of attack on the 
southern route revealed by the decoded U-boat 
signals, Hose reorganized his escort force yet 
again to provide stronger protection. Freed from 
responsibility for the HC transports, the US 
submarine chasers now screened the HS series, 
in combination with the slower auxiliary patrol 
ships Cartier, Acadia, and Hochelaga, and two 
or three trawlers.51 
With the auxi l iary pat ro l sh ips now 
committed to the ocean convoys, their previous 
tasks of coastal escort and special patrols fell to 
the trawlers. During September, with some 
transfers from Halifax and the completion of 
additional new construction, the strength of the 
trawler force at Sydney increased to 29 vessels.52 
The drifter force of the Sydney command had 
meanwhile grown to 40, with others temporarily 
attached to help with the multiplying demands 
for s t and ing pa t ro l s — at St. J o h n ' s , 
Newfoundland and the Canso Strait, in addition 
to those in the gulf, and the original and still 
priority commitment for coverage in the Cabot 
Strait. Inadequate facilities to deal with "shake 
down" problems of the new construction, and 
heavy wear on the craft that had arrived early in 
the season meant that breakdowns continued 
to trouble the flotilla, not to mention fatigue 
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A welcome reinforcement was the long-
promised US Navy seaplane unit, which began 
to arrive at the end of August. The 250 American 
personnel from the US Naval Reserve Flying 
Corps under the command of Lieutenant Robert 
Donahue of the US Coast Guard established a 
temporary base at Indian Beach at North Sydney, 
where they immediately ran up the stars and 
stripes. The officers were quartered in town while 
the men were housed in tents provided by the 
Canadian army. The gale on 7 September that 
had caused the submarine chasers such a 
terrifying night in the Cabot Strait, flattened the 
tents and damaged the first of the Curtiss HS2L 
seaplanes that the airmen were then assembling. 
This setback was quickly overcome, and one 
machine began test flights on the 11th, causing 
a local sensation.54 "Many people," according to 
the Post, "are suffering from sore necks" after 
rushing about and straining to keep the aircraft 
in view.55 
The first operational flights took place on 
22 September when two machines each flew for 
about two and a half hours, covering HS 56 as it 
sailed. By early October, when a total of four 
aircraft were operational and two more had been 
delivered, coverage was possible on the full scale 
that had been planned. As HS 58 formed up and 
sailed on the 8th, three aircraft flew a total of 
five missions that provided constant air cover 
from 1000 hours until 1730 hours when the 
convoy was about 60 miles out to sea. One of 
the aircraft suffered engine trouble that forced 
it to put down offshore but, despite the heavy 
swell, trawlers of the Canadian flotilla soon 
rescued the airmen and towed in the aircraft 
before it had suffered any serious damage. 
Convoy coverage continued on the scale given to 
HS 58 during the rest of October. 
The camp at Indian Beach was only a stopgap 
while work was carried out on the permanent 
site at nearby Kelly's Beach, where the water 
approaches had to be dredged and the ground 
needed filling and levelling. Construction of the 
buildings, three three-storey units, had to be 
quick and of top quality because the US Navy 
had made the early provision of "permanent" 
accommodation for its men a precondition for 
the dispatch of the air units to a northern climate 
so late in the season. Indeed, the US Navy 
Department insisted upon the use of its standard 
designs, which featured full concrete basements 
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and steam heating plants. The beginning of this 
work was delayed until September because the 
Depar tment of Public Works, which was 
responsible for the project, hesitated to award 
such expensive contracts when tarpaper huts set 
on sills on the ground and heated by coal stoves 
were considered adequa te for Canad ian 
personnel.56 Once started, progress was rapid 
even though, as one weekly report put it, "the 
very bad weather has turned the site into a 
quagmire."57 By late October, one of the two 
planned hundred-man barracks and a large 
stores building were nearly complete and the 
basements of a mess hall and the second 
barracks were finished.58 The performance of 
both the American aviation personnel and the 
Canadian building contractor's crews were all 
the more impressive in view of the fact that an 
influenza epidemic hit the camp in late 
September, causing at least two deaths among 
the Americans.59 The Canadian navy department 
immediately rented several houses in town to 
enable the American personnel to move out of 
the unhealthy tents and sheds at Indian Beach.60 
The large and costly undertaking at North Sydney 
and the similar development at Baker Point, 
Dartmouth — the origin of the present Canadian 
Forces air station Shearwater — were intended 
to lay the foundations for a still greater effort in 
1919 when it seemed certain the U-boats would 
return in greater numbers and operate more 
aggressively. Additional air defences planned 
included both self-propelled dirigible and escort-
towed observat ion ba l loons , and the 
establishment of sub-stations Cape Sable, 
Canso, Cape North or the Magdalen Islands, and 
in the vicinity of the Strait of Belle Isle. The Royal 
Canadian Naval Air Service, which had begun to 
organize in the fall of the 1918, would ultimately 
take over these operations, using the equipment 
supplied by the Americans.61 
Similarly, the Canadian navy regarded the 
hastily assembled organization at Sydney as 
merely a beginning and not a very satisfactory 
one. An exhausted, frustrated Hose made it clear 
that his fleet, its supporting facilities, and the 
haphazard manner of providing and training 
personnel would all have to be completely 
overhauled. Most importantly, better warships 
were essential, and during the fall of 1918 senior 
officers and the Canadian government pressed 
the British and Americans hard for the provision 
of destroyer type escorts in 1919.62 Fortunately, 
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U-156's i n s h o r e o p e r a t i o n s a n d t h e l e s s 
destructive cruise offshore by U-l17 in August 
proved to be the worst that was coming in 1918. 
A l t h o u g h U-l55 a r r i v e d in t h e Ha l i f ax 
approaches in mid-September, it lay low, unable 
to find m u c h shipping. Two small minefields 
planted by the submar ine did no damage before 
the Canadian forces discovered them. Ignoring 
orders to p u s h further into the Canadian area, 
the boat h a d then moved to the US coast. The 
two submar ines following U-l55 did not in fact 
press on beyond the central Atlantic.63 
Victory celebrations got unde r way early in 
Sydney . A p r e m a t u r e a n n o u n c e m e n t on 7 
November that "the Hun had finally crawled into 
h i s hole,"64 a n d ano the r on the 10 th caused 
spontaneous festivities in the streets. The actual 
news of the armistice on the morning of the 11 t h 
seemed somewhat anti-climatic.6 5 Organized 
events on the 12th fully restored the festive mood. 
The crews of the US submar ine chasers gave a 
dance at a hall in downtown Sydney "that will 
long be remembered by those who were fortunate 
enough to a t tend it," because of the exposure to 
the latest t rends in popular music sou th of the 
border. Among the enter ta iners was s e aman 
Jones who "sang the American "Rag" songs in 
an inimitable m a n n e r and was compelled to 
respond to each solo several times. It was a new 
thing to most of the people there and they enjoyed 
it immensely." The dance music was provided 
by a jazz b a n d and, in the words of the Post, 
"they certainly did p u t some "pep" into it."66 
At North Sydney the victory celebrations got 
a little out of h a n d . Following Thanksgiving 
services at several of the churches , followed by 
a pa rade of the school children "in which the 
firemen and a n u m b e r of American naval men 
and aviators took part," the festivities concluded 
in the evening with a large bonfire at the ballast 
g round where the kaiser was bu rned in effigy. 
During the evening, unfortunately, there were 
"several clashes between re turned soldiers and 
A m e r i c a n s a i l o r s " o n C o m m e r c i a l S t r ee t , 
apparently the only serious incidents of violence. 
Several arrests were made of disturbers on both 
sides of the argument, and the climax was 
reached about eleven o'clock when some person 
set fire to a mattress in the jail, which 
necessitated the calling out of the firemen. Little 
damage was done by the fire, but one soldier 
was nearly overcome by the smoke.67 
A thrilling, if brief, epoch in the city's history 
symbolically came to an end on 25 November 
when the officers and men of the naval base 
hos ted a farewell dance at Sydney's hockey 
arena. More t h a n 1,100 guests , "everybody and 
his wife and a lot of others with other peoples ' 
wives," as the Post p u t it, were in a t tendance . 
Special t ram cars were r u n to Whitney Pier at 
1:30 am to take home guests from tha t area, 
while a special ferry operated from North Sydney 
for the occasion. 
There were men in uniforms of all descriptions 
and ranks of the army and navy, American and 
Canadian alike allied themselves for the evening's 
fun and all thought of the war was forgotten. 
People who had not danced for years forgot that 
they were too old to dance and after sitting out 
for a time they were seen to move gingerly, at 
first, about the floor, and then they danced with 
all their old time vim. 
The arena was transformed for the occasion into 
"a fairyland" with s t reamers of coloured lights, 
flags and bunt ing. At the rear was a huge un ion 
jack and across the centre was Nelson's famous 
signal, "England expects everyone to do his duty," 
and as the Post said, "everybody did...The affair 
will long be remembered as one of the mos t 
enjoyable ever in the city." At the close of the 
evening, 
three cheers were given for Mr Menzies and the 
bandsmen and the members of the Jazz Band 
orchestra, who gave their services free for the 
evening. After these one of the navy men called 
for cheers for Sydney and these were given with 
a heartiness which left little doubt as to the warm 
feeling that Sydney holds in the hearts of the men 
of the navy of both services. On the other hand 
they have made friends and they have most of 
them won the respect and liking of the people of 
the city.68 
On the following morning, Capta in J a m e s 
Turnbull, the acting port convoy officer, officially 
closed the Sydney convoy office, though not 
before formally thanking the harbour ' s pilots for 
"the smar t way in which they have cooperated 
with me in the sailing of the convoys."69 That 
same day the naval patrol organization at Sydney 
received instruct ions to discontinue operations 
a n d proceed to Halifax.70 The h u n d r e d s of 
servicemen from Canada, Britain and the United 
States would very quickly be gone and the naval 
b a s e a n d h a r b o u r for t i f icat ions wou ld b e 
dismantled, presumably never to be resurrected 
39 
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if this had indeed been the war to end war. Twenty 
years later, of course, Sydney would again be 
invaded by even greater numbers of soldiers, 
airmen, and seamen from Canada, Britain and 
the United States and other nations as well. They 
would stay much longer — six years. The 
American and British presence would be 
transient, however, as the Canadian forces 
controlled and provided most of what was 
needed for Sydney's much greater part in the 
Second World War. 
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